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I Do! OR Do I? A PRACTICAL GUIDE To LOVE,
COURTSHIP, AND HEARTBREAK IN NEW YORK - OR WHO GETS THE RING BACK FOLLOWING A BROKEN
ENGAGEMENT?
ADAM

I.

D. GLASSMAN

EXPRESSIONS OF LOVE

Since the dawn of time, suitors in virtually every part of the
world have expressed their everlasting affection for those they love
and desire to wed in a myriad of ways. For instance, great poets,
such as John Keats and Christopher Marlowe, relied upon their
eloquence
to win over their beloveds. Marlowe's alter ego and
2
2
swain , the Passionate Shepherd, endeavored to conquer the heart
of his true love with the following words:
Come live with me and be my love,
And we will all the pleasures prove,
That valleys, groves, hills and fields,
Woods or steepy mountains yields.
And we will sit upon the rocks,
Seeing the shepherds feed their flocks
By shallow rivers, to whose falls
Melodious birds sing madrigals.
And I will make thee beds of roses,
Assistant Professor of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch
College/CUNY. J.D. 1994, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1991,
Brooklyn College/CUNY. I would like to thank Melissa Glassman, Hope
Glassman, Leo Glassman, and Harrison Glassman for their undying support and
inspiration. I would also like to thank Alan C. Glassman, Esq., who inspired me
to become a lawyer, and who made my career as a lawyer possible. Finally, I
would like to thank the New York State Library and its staff for its invaluable
research assistance.
2 An Old English term for a male admirer or suitor.
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And a thousand fragrant posies,
A cap of flowers and a kirtle
Embroidered all with leaves of myrtle;
A gown made of the finest wool,
Which from our pretty lambs we pull;
Fair-lined slippers for the cold,
With buckles of the purest gold;
A belt of straw and ivy buds,
With coral clasps and amber studs;
And if these pleasures may thee move,
Come live with me and be my love.
The shepherd swains shall dance and sing
For thy delight each May morning;
If these delights thy mind may move,3
Then live with me and be my love.
In modern times, suitors have come to rely upon gifts and
tokens as a means of expressing their love and commitment to
those they intend to marry. In fact, during the twentieth century
the engagement
ring became a "common symbol of impending
4
marriage.",
One learned jurist has noted that the:
[Engagement] ring is employed in rites of courtship
and marriage in many cultures, primitive and
sophisticated; in widely dispersed regions of the
Christopher Marlowe, The Passionate Shepherd to His Love (1599).
Excerpted from Palgrave, Francis T., The Golden Treasury. London: Macmillan,
1875; Bartleby.com, 1999, http://www.bartleby.conVl06/, printed July 4, 2002.
4 Rebecca Tushnet, Note, Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE L.J. 2583, 2591, note
41 (1998), citing Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
203, 206 (1990). Tushnet notes that "[t]he [diamond] industry enjoyed a
phenomenal success during the period following 1935, and by 1965, 80 percent
3

of all brides chose diamond engagement rings.
THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 99-101 (1994).

cf. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
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earth; persisting through the centuries, in fact
millennia. In our culture, the ring generally is
placed on one of the fingers, in others, it may be
attached to other positions of the anatomy, at
intermediate points from the top of the head to the
tip of the toes. It is a universal symbol of deep
seated sexual and social ramifications, a seminal
area of research for behavioral scientists. Is it any
such complicated problems
wonder that it presents
5
for mere lawyers?
However, like many things, love is fickle - and when it
sours, inevitably, the issue of who is entitled to ownership of the
One jurist, commenting on the
engagement ring surfaces.
mercurial nature of the relationship between two particular
litigants, noted that while "the atmosphere was festive" following
their engagement "and a marriage appeared on the horizon, during
the primrose path of this blissful
their journey of love to the altar,
6
dead-end.",
a
to
detoured
pair
All too often "[iun adjudicating the grievances of life and
love . . . courts [and legislatures] have needed to address the

disputed ownership of an engagement ring following a broken
engagement." 7 New York is no exception.
H.

INTRODUCTION

Lawsuits involving the return of engagement rings, as well
as other gifts given in contemplation of marriage, have been
plentiful in New York State over the past one hundred years. The

5 Goldstein

v. Rosenthal, 56 Misc. 2d 311 (Civil Ct., City of N.Y., Bronx
County 1968).
6 Friedman v. Geller, 82 Misc. 2d 291, 292 (Civil Ct., City of N.Y., Kings
County 1975).
7 Case Analysis, Recent Case: Property Law - Pennsylvania Court Holds That
EngagementRing Must Be Returned Regardless of Who Broke the EngagementLindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643 (Pa. 1999), 113 HARvARD L. REV. 1876 (2000).
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law governing the status of ownership of such things 8 has been in a
constant state of flux over that same period of time.
Most recently, New York, like many other states, in an
attempt to stabilize its rules concerning the return of gifts given in
contemplation of marriage, 9 has endeavored to implement an
objective, no-fault approach to this issue. However, such effort
has fallen short of the mark, and as a result, New York's current
law 10 remains fraught with uncertainty. This uncertainty has lead
to inconsistent and unpredictable results in the courts.
Ultimately, if New York State is to achieve the stability and
predictability it so desires with respect to its law governing the
return of gifts given in contemplation of marriage, 1 then its
Legislature 2 must act to correct the deficiencies in its existing law.
Il.

CASE STUDY

Nick and Nora met one summer's eve. He had just ended a
tempestuous relationship with another woman. Nora was a breath
of fresh air.
She was exciting, beautiful, determined, and
ambitious. Sparks flew.
Things progressed quickly. Within weeks Nick and Nora
were seeing each other exclusively. Within months they were
living together.
That autumn, under a beautiful harvest moon, Nick gazed
lovingly into Nora's eyes and popped the question; he asked Nora
to marry him. She eagerly accepted his proposal. The twenty
thousand dollar engagement ring Nick presented to Nora was
simply breathtaking.
Several days later, Nora presented Nick with an elegant
gold watch as an engagement gift. Within weeks a summer
wedding had been set. Time was short and there was much to do.
As couples often do, Nick and Nora registered for
8 Following a broken engagement.

9 Where such marriage does not ensue.
1o See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80-b (Consol. 2003).
11Where such marriage does not ensue.
12And not its courts.
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engagement gifts at Tiffany's.
Their gift list was long.
Announcements were sent. The engagement gifts began to pile up
in Nora's parent's attic.
Nick and Nora's parents were elated. Nick was settling
down. Nora had found the man of her dreams. The excitement
was tangible.
As is customary, Nora's parents agreed to pay for the
wedding. They retained the services of a caterer, florist and
photographer. Before they knew it, Nora's parents had spent
twenty thousand dollars in anticipation of the big day.
As their wedding day drew closer, Nick became unsettled.
He and Nora had grown distant. They had been fighting. Nick's
fear of commitment had reared its ugly head once more. By
springtime it was clear - Nick had to get out before it was too late.
He did not care how.
Nick came clean on the eve of their wedding day. He told
Nora that he did not want to marry her. She was enraged. They
fought for hours. On the morning of their wedding day, Nora
demanded that Nick leave their apartment.
The last time they saw each other, Nick asked Nora to
return the engagement ring. After a brief pause, Nora chuckled,
looked Nick in the eye and said, "Over my dead body! You broke
my heart - you shattered my life. I'm keeping the ring."
The next morning, Nick called his attorney who promptly
drafted a letter requesting that Nora return the engagement ring.
Upon receiving the letter, Nora and her parents went to see their
attorney.
Nora's father was livid. He had been unsuccessful in
obtaining refunds from the florist, caterer and bandleader.
Nick received the first set of suit papers on June 1. Nora's
suit sought the return of the gold watch she had given Nick.
Shortly thereafter, Nick received the second set of suit papers.
Nora's parents sought reimbursement of all deposit monies paid to
the florist, caterer and bandleader from Nick.
Nick interposed a counterclaim against Nora based upon
her failure to return the engagement ring.
Who will win each of these causes of action? The answer
to this query hinges upon how we characterize the above
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transactions. 13 "How we see these acts will be crucial in
determining" whether: (1) Nick will get the engagement ring back;
(2) Nora will recover the gold watch; (3) Nora's parents will be
entitled to reimbursement from Nick 14 and; (4) whether those third
parties who gave Nick and Nora engagement gifts will be entitled
to their return.

IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF HEART BALM 15 LAWS AND THE

STATUTORY BAR AGAINST COMMON LAW ACTIONS FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT TO MARRY

Early on in American jurisprudence, "women were able to
recover damages when men promised marriage and then reneged;
the action was known simply as 'breach of promise. ' 16 These
cases were primarily concerned with remedying the financial
harms of a broken engagement; eventually, "the action was
reconceptualized
over time as one centering around emotional
7
wounds."'
"From the 1930's through the 1950's, a wave of
antiheartbalm proposals swept the United States. Responding to
charges that heartbalm actions enabled designing women to
blackmail worthy men, legislators in many states passed statutes
eliminating breach-of-promise and related actions."'
13Joanna Grossman, Who Gets the Engagement Ring When the Wedding is

Called Off?, FindLaw's Writ (2001), at http://www.writ.news.findlaw.com/
frossman/20011023.html.

Id.

15 "'Heartbalm' statutes are also known as 'Heart Balm,' 'heart-balm'

and
'Heart-Balm' statutes. The name is a sardonic reference to the broken heart that
supposedly justified a breach of promise suit." Jeffrey D. Kobar, Heartbalm
Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1770, 1797, n. 4 (1985).
16Tushnet, supra note 4 at 2586.
17 Id.
Tushnet notes that "[b]y the beginning of the twentieth century,
recoverable damages included the loss of the benefits a woman would have
received from marriage, her loss of a chance to marry someone else, and the
emotional harm she suffered from the broken engagement, giving rise to the
popular name for the resultant lawsuits - heartbalm suits." Id.
8 Id. According to Tushnet:
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Generally, it has been stated that:
The action for breach of promise to marry is a
common law action combining elements of both tort
and contract, in which the plaintiff sues the
defendant for breaching an agreement between them
to marry. The action has been severely, and almost
uniformly, criticized as being anachronistic,
contrary to modem notions of justice, and subject to
abuse by blackmail. Beginning in 1935, many
states enacted sweeping statutes colloquially called
"heart balm" acts that abolished actions for breach
of promise to marry and often abolished the related
common law actions for alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, and seduction as well.19
As of 1985, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia

The blackmail argument reflected a belief that heartbalm actions
attracted undue attention, embarrassing both courts and the parties; men
would settle baseless lawsuits, the argument ran, rather than contest the
demeaning allegations involved. The actions were denounced as freaks
of the common law, containing unjustified and illogical mixtures of tort
and contract: Though the action was based on a contract-like promise,
tort damages were available, no proof of an agreement to marry was
required beyond the female plaintiff's word, and witnesses who in other
cases would have been declared incompetent and biased were allowed
to testify. These deviations from established categories occurred
precisely because courtship was private, conducted differently from
standard business deals, further supporting the reformers' claim that the
courts should avoid such cases entirely. Damages, it was also said,
could not be precisely measured in such cases. The hybrid nature of
heart balm actions and the blackmail they invited were particularly
offensive because only women, in practice, could bring such suits.
Finally, reformers argued that heartbalm torts reflected a
misunderstanding of marriage, which was a relationship incapable of
measurement in monetary terms.
This last claim, the
"anticommodification" argument, became increasingly important as the
anti-heart balm laws were interpreted by courts. Id. at 2587-88.
19 Kobar, supra note 15 at 1770, 1771.
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had enacted some form of heart balm legislation.2"
With respect to most heart balm laws, the issue arises as to
whether such laws bar all suits "involving a marriage promise or
whether they bar breach of promise to marry suits but 22allow other
actions 2 1 based on traditional common law and equity.
"After antiheartbalm statutes were passed, courts had to
define their boundaries. ' 23 Many courts found that "[w]hen a harm
sprang, not from the loss of a particular person's love ...but from
gifts in anticipation of marriage ....antiheartbalm principles were
not implicated." 24 In leaving the door open to potential lawsuits
for the recovery of gifts given in contemplation of marriage, these
courts carved out
a common law exception to their state's anti25
heart balm laws.
Prior to 1965, New York courts declined to follow such
approach and, thus, donors were not permitted to recover an

§ 6-5-330 (1975); CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.5(d) (Deering
1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52572(b) (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. § 771.01 (1983); IND. CODE § 34-4-4-1 (1976);
20 Id.; see ALA. CODE

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14,

§ 854 (1964);

MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.

§ 5-301 (1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 47A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2901 (West 1968); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1602 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.380 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:11
(1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1952); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 80 (a
& b) (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Baldwin 1985); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 171 (Purdon 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1001 (Supp.
1984); VA. CODE § 8.01-220 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (Supp. 1984);
WIS. STAT. § 768.01 (1981-1982); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-23-101 (1977); D.C.
§ 16-923 (1981).
an action to recover an engagement gift or other gift given in
contemplation of marriage where such marriage does not ensue.
22 Kobar, supra note 15 at 1772.
23 Tushnet, supra note 4 at 2591.
CODE ANN.
21 Such as

24
25

id
Id. (citing Norman v. Burks, 209 P.2d 815, 817 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949);

Gill v. Shively, 320 So.2d 415, 416-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Vann v.
Vehrs, 633 N.E.2d 02, 104 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994); DeCicco v. Barker, 159 N.E.2d
534, 535 (Mass. 1959); Gikas v. Nicholis, 71 A.2d 785, 786 (N.H. 1950);
Beberma v. Segal, 69 A.2d 587 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Dir. 1949); Wilson v.
Dabo, 461 N.E.2d 8, 9-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
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antenuptial gift. 26 The theory behind the New York approach was
that since the Legislature saw fit to bar all actions for breach of
contract to marry, 27 it was not necessary for a woman to return a
gift given in contemplation of marriage, "even when they had
themselves broken their engagements. ' '2 °
V.

COMMON LAW THEORIES OF RECOVERY

How should "the act of giving an engagement ring" 29 be
characterized? "How we see this act will be crucial in determining
when the ring should, and should not, have to be returned... ,30 in
the event a marriage does not ensue.
Historically, "[p]roperty disputes between engaged parties
31
were originally settled through breach of promise to marry suits".
Id. at 2594; see Andie v. Kaplan, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429 (App. Div., 2d Dept.
1942); see also Josephson v. Dry Dock Sav. Inst., 266 A.D. 992 (N.Y. App.

26

Div., 1st Dept. 1943).
27 Tushnet, supra note 4 at 2594.
28 Id. According to Tushnet, "[t]his construction elicited harsh criticism from
legal observers: 'The weapon of the 'gold digger' under the old law was the
action for breach of promise. Now, every deceiver ...has a new weapon. It is
the promise to marry'." Id. (citing W.J. Brockelbank, The Nature of a Promise
to Marry - A Study in Comparative Law (pt. 2), 41 ILL. L. REV. 199, 207-08
(1946); see also Goldstein v. Rosenthal, 288 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (Civ. Ct. 1968)
("Instead of suing for breach of promise, a resourceful young woman would
simply persuade her swain to shower her with gifts in anticipation of a marriage
which she herself would then reject. In trying to remedy an old abuse , the courts
seemingly permitted a new one."); State Of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n,
Report Of The Law Revision Commission For 1947, No. 65, at 229-30 (1948)
(arguing that rings and other property transferred in anticipation of marriage
should be returned to the donor if the marriage did not occur); Robert
Markewich, Take Back Your Ring, Sir!, B.BULL. (N.Y. County), Mar. 1949, at
23 (same); George Reiss, Note, The Heart Balm Act and Ante-Nuptial Gifts, 13
BROOK. L. REv. 174, 182 (1947) (same); Duane Anderson, Case Comment,
Domestic Relations: Engagement Rings and the "Anti-Heart-Balm" Statute, 3
U. FLA L. REv. 377, 379 (1950) (same).
29 Grossman, supra note 13.
30 Id.
31 Brian L. Kruckenberg, "I Don't": Determining Ownership of the Engagement
Ring When the Engagement Terminates, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 425, 428 (1998),
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"This cause of action began in Europe over three hundred years
ago, and it, like many legal traditions32 in Europe, made its way into
the jurisprudence of American law".
A.

THE CONTRACT APPROACH

A number of courts have elected to apply contract
principles in cases involving disputes over the ownership of
antenuptial gifts. 33 While it may be said that an engagement ring is
"'consideration' - a thing of value given in exchange to create a
contract," 34 fundamentally, it is legally disingenuous 35 to classify
the transaction involving the exchange of the engagement ring as a
contract. This is necessarily the case, since the validity of a
contract hinges upon, amongst other things, a mutuality of
exchange of consideration, and in the typical engagement scenario
the recipient of the ring offers no consideration at all.36
Other tribunals have concluded that while the giving of the
37
ring does not, per se, create an ordinary, bilateral contract,
nevertheless the recipient of the ring "is agreeing to an option
contract." 38 This approach suggests that the ring's benefactor is
buying the right to marry his or her beloved, and that such right
exclusive to him or her for the entire engagement
shall remain
39
interlude.
In contractual terms, "characterizing the ring exchange as
an option contract" 40 suggests that a "jilted bride," 4 1 presumably
Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631 (Kan. 1997); citing Homer H. Clark, Jr., The
Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, § 1.1 (2d ed. 1987).
32

Id. at 426; citing Clark, § 1.1, at 1-2.

33 Where marriage does not ensue.
34 Grossman, supra note 13.
35 At least in most situations, and barring instances where the doctrine of

6romissory estoppel might apply.

Id.

37 That is, a contract in which each party exchanges a promise, as opposed to the

actual performance or forbearance of an act.
38

Id.

39 Id.
40 id.
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the individual who extended the option, should not have to return
the ring, since the groom-to-be 42 "got what he paid for - the option
to marry a particular woman." It follows that where the ring-giver
does not exercise such option to marry, 43 he should not be entitled
to its return.44
Alternatively, if it is the ring's benefactor who has been
jilted, then the ring-giver should be entitled to its 45return, as well as
damages due to the recipient's breach of contract.
Despite the application of contract principles by some
judges in antenuptial gift cases, the majority of the bench has opted
not to adjudicate such disputes in this manner.
B.

THE ENGAGEMENT RING AS A TOKEN

Yet another, albeit sexist, theory relating to the return of an
engagement ring 46 is that the "ring is symbolic of 'title' to the bride
-- a legal right in her, as if she were ' property
-- being transferred
47
from her father to her future husband.
As one commentator has noted:
That theory, offensive though it is, would imply a
ring need never be given back -- and would, in that
limited sense at least, ironically favor women's
interests. Transfers of symbolic tokens generally do
not need to be returned, even if the underlying deal
falls through.48
Not surprisingly, modern day tribunals have avoided
characterizing the exchange of an engagement ring as a symbolic
Id. This assumes the bride-to-be was the recipient of the engagement ring.
This assumes the groom-to-be was the ring-giver.
43 As opposed to the ring's recipient calling off the engagement.
41
42

44Grossman, supra note 13.
45

Id.

46Where marriage does not ensue.
47 Grossman, supra note 13.
48

Id.
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transfer of title to the bride.
C.

EQUITY

Still, another approach employed by the judiciary in this
area is to recognize the right of recovery by the donor of a gift
given in contemplation of marriage, in order to avoid injustice.
For instance, in cases involving allegations of fraud, a number of
courts have recognized that where a donee has obtained a gift
given in contemplation of marriage through either deceptive, or
fraudulent means, disallowing the recovery 49by the donor of such a
gift would, in effect, reward the wrongdoer.
Courts, in invoking their equitable powers, have sought to
prevent "wrongdoing donees" '50 from being unjustly enriched by
returning to donors antenuptial gifts. The vehicle used most often
by jurists subscribing to this theory is the equitable remedy of
rescission. 51 However, the use
of rescission in the given context
52
has met with mixed opinion.
49 Id. Even in the absence of fraud or affirmative misconduct, in some instances,

these same principles have been applied to a donee that the court has determined
was at fault for the break up of the engagement.
50 That is, donees that the courts have determined were at fault for the break
up
of the engagement.
51See Unger v. Hirsch, 180 Misc. 381 (City Ct. of N.Y., Bronx County 1943).
In Unger, recovery of an engagement ring was permitted on the ground that the
giving of the ring was closely associated with the contract to marry and that
abandonment of this contract was equivalent to the rescission of any other
contract and had the same consequences. Hence, the ring should be returned in
order to place the parties in the status quo. N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., Report 237
(1947).
52 In fact, one legal commentator has noted:
This theory may be criticized on the ground that in most cases it is
highly improbable that the parties intended the ring or other gift as
consideration for the recipient's promise to marry. Although there are
cases where the transfer of valuable property is the actual inducement
that leads the transferee to assent to the marriage, a different
interpretation is required where the gift is an engagement ring.
However the rescission theory is not untenable as a basis for the
recovery of the ring or its value. Although the performance for which
restitution is sought in the typical rescission case is a performance
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It should be noted that the justification for awarding the
equitable remedy of rescission, and the view that
54 the engagement
53
ring is a conditional gift, have a common basis.
In the context of unjust enrichment, tribunals have not
concerned themselves with the issues of fault or wrongdoing, and
they have ordered the recovery by the donor of an antenuptial gift
on the grounds that it would be inequitable for the donee to retain
the donor has not
the benefit of such gift after a breakup, since
55
return.
in
benefit
any
received
himself/herself
D.

THE GIFT APPROACH

Historically, the most prevalent approach taken by courts in
attempting to resolve engagement ring disputes has been: (1) to
view the giving of an engagement ring as a gift and; (2) to apply
the laws governing gifts to such disputes.56
Generally, a gift is "something voluntarily transferred by
one person to another without compensation." 57 In simple terms, a
gift may be distinguished from a contract in that in the former there
is a unilateral exchange of consideration, whereas in the latter,

rendered under the contract as part of an agreed exchange, restitution
may also be given where the performance was rendered in reliance on
the defendant's promise yet not in consideration of a bargain made by
him. Gribben, Quasi-Contract:Gifts; Effects of New York Anti-Heart
Balm Statute, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 401 (1944).
53 See discussion regarding conditional gifts, N.Y Law Rev. Comm., Report 237
(1947).
54, 'This basis, sufficient in itself to justify recovery, is to be found in the law of
quasi-contracts. Where the gift is intimately associated with a prospective
marriage which the donee has promised to enter into and the marriage is
prevented without the donor's fault, unjust enrichment of the donee should be
prevented by permitting the donor to recover the gift he has made in reliance
upon the promise of the other party." N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., Report 238
(1947).
55 Id.
56 id.

57 Merriam-Webster's CollegiateDictionary, www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary,

Merriam-Webster, Inc. (2002), printed June 15, 2002.
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58
there is a bilateral exchange of consideration.
Once we classify the engagement ring as a gift, we must
then determine whether such gift is conditional or unconditional.59
The answer to that question will determine whether or not the
donor is entitled to its return.
"Courts, by and large, have not adopted the unconditional
gift approach, however.
They have opted for the conditional gift
' 60
approach instead.
The engagement ring:

Is the article most commonly bestowed upon a
betrothed ....The ring differs from other gifts in
that it is given and worn to signify the engagement
itself. The courts sometimes take the position that it
is given as a pledge, that the absolute ownership
does not pass until the marriage is accomplished,
but the absolute ownership passes even though the
marriage does not take1 place, if the failure is
6
chargeable to the donor.
According to the Restatement of the Law, Restitution:
A person who has conferred a benefit upon another,
manifesting that he does not expect compensation
therefor, is not entitled to restitution merely because
his expectation that an existing relation will
continue or that a future relation will come into
existence is not realized, unless conferring of the
62
benefit is conditioned thereon.
58 Grossman, supra note 13.

59 Grossman, supra note 13.
60

id.

61 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., Report 238 at 236 (1947).
62 Restatement of the Law, Restitution § 58, American

Law Institute (1937).

According to comment a:
The rule stated in this Section is applicable to a husband or wife who
makes gifts to the other spouse in the expectation that the relation will
continue and to a man or woman who makes gifts to a person with
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favors the
Hence, it would appear that the Restatement
63
view that an engagement ring is a conditional gift.
Nevertheless, the commentary to the Restatement of the
Law, Restitution section 58, notes that a "gift may be conditional
upon the continuation of a relation, and if conditional the donor is
entitled to its return if the relation terminates or is not entered into.
Likewise, as in the case of engagement and wedding gifts, justice
may require the creation of a condition although the donor had no
such condition in mind." 64
Seemingly, this opens the door to the possibility that an
engagement ring may be treated as a conditional gift, thus entitling
in
the donor to its return, provided that such condition "is stated
65
circumstances."
the
from
inferred
be
specific words or it may
However, where such conditional language is not expressly
stated, the commentary validates in rather blanket fashion that
marriage
"[g]ifts made in the hope that a marriage or contract of
66
fraud.",
of
absence
the
in
recoverable,
not
will result are
whom promises to marry have been exchanged, even though
subsequently there is a wrongful termination of the relation by the
donee ....If, however, the relation has been fraudulently entered into
by the donee for the purpose of receiving gifts and subsequently
terminating the relation, or if the retention is simulated. .

. ,

or if there

is other fraudulent conduct because of which the gifts are made, then
restitution is granted under the rule stated in § 26. Likewise the gift
may be conditional as stated in comments b and c.
Id.
of the Law, Restitution § 58, at comment b.
64
Restatement
65
63

1Id.at § 58.
Id. at § 58, comment c.
The Restatement further states at comment c that:
Gifts made in anticipation of marriage are not ordinarily expressed to
be conditional and, although there is an engagement to marry, if the
marriage fails to occur without the fault of the donee, normally the gift
cannot be recovered. If, however, the donee obtained the gift
fraudulently or if the gift was made for a purpose that could be
achieved only by the marriage, a donor who is not himself at fault is
entitled to restitution if the marriage does not take place, even if the gift
66

was of money .... If there is an engagement to marry and the donee,

having received the gift without fraud, later wrongfully breaks the
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Perhaps this inconsistency may be reconciled by viewing
that portion of comment b,67 as a complement to comment c, to the
extent that in a case of misconduct or fraud on the part of the
donee, a court would be justified in implying a condition, even
,68
though the donor "had no such condition in mind . . ,68
thus,
allowing the donor to recover the ring.
1.

THE CONDITIONAL GIFT APPROACH

In the absence of statutory authority, many courts have
relied upon the conditional gift theory in actions seeking recovery
of gifts given in contemplation of marriage. 69 Courts, in following
this approach, "consider engagement gifts to be conditioned upon
the subsequent marriage of the parties.",70 It follows that where a
marriage does not take place, the condition precedent to retention
of the gift given in contemplation of marriage has not been met,
and therefore, it must returned by the donee to the donor.71
Alternatively stated, "this approach means the gift of the ring
'vests' with the would-be bride only when the condition -- the
marriage -- occurs. Conversely, when the condition fails and the
marriage72 doesn't happen, for whatever reason, the gift never
'vests."'
While the conditional gift approach is the predominant
approach utilized by the courts in resolving antenuptial gift cases,
some members of the bench will not "imply a condition of
marriage to a gift simply because it was given during the
promise of marriage, the donor is entitled to restitution if the gift is an
engagement ring, a family heirloom or other similar thing intimately
connected with the marriage, but not if the gift is one of money
intended to be used by the donee before the marriage ....
67 Id. at § 58, comment b.
68 Id.
69 Elaine M. Tomko, Annotation, Rights in Respect of Engagement and
Courtship Presents When Marriage Does Not Ensue, 44 A.L.R.5th 1, note 9
(2001).
70 id.
71 id.
72

Grossman, supra note 13.
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engagement period and will not order a return of the engagement
gift unless
expressly conditioned upon a marriage which did not
73
ensue."
At least one court, in recognizing the fallacy of such view,
has noted that "[a]n express condition of this type would rarely be
found," 74 and that such condition "is one to be inferred from the
facts ..."7 on a case by case basis. 76

Courts, in applying the conditional gift approach have,
generally, followed three different paths in "fashioning
a rule about
77
ring return: no-fault, modified fault, and fault."
"Under a strict no-fault rule, the ring-giver is entitled to
return of the ring -- or its equivalent value -- if the marriage never

materializes. No questions asked. 78
While the recent trend has been for the judiciary to
advocate or adopt no-fault principles, most79 courts continue to
apply a modified fault, or strict fault analysis.
According to the modified fault rule, the donor is entitled to
reclaim the ring, or other gift given in contemplation of marriage,

73

74

Tomko, supra note 69.
See Beck v. Cohen, 237 A.D. 729, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933).

75 Id.

In determining whether or not a gift was given in contemplation of marriage,
the court may look at factors such as "the occasion of making the gift, the nature
of the article give, [and] the donor's reason for making the gift." N.Y. Law Rev.
Comm., Report 238 at 238 (1947).
76

77 Grossman, supra note 13.
78

Id. Grossman explains that this approach has been:
Criticized for making the decision to propose marriage - which might
induce the fianc6e into a more intimate relationship - costless to the
fianc6. The result, critics say, is that the would-be bride may be hurt,
while her fiancd may become engaged carelessly, without a sufficiently
thoughtful commitment.
There is also some imbalance in a law that gives the ring-giver his ring
back, but does nothing to compensate the putative bride or her family,
who traditionally pay for weddings, for unrecoverable outlays to
caterers, florists, dress designers, and the like.

79

id.
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so long as he or80 she did not break off the engagement -"justifiably or not.",
Finally, the third approach is the strict fault rule. As with
modified fault, pursuant to this rule, the donor is entitled to the
return of the engagement ring, or other gift given in contemplation
of marriage, provided he or she he did not break off the
engagement. 8 1 However, "in this scheme, a determination of fault
requires a more nuanced analysis, which examines not only who
called off the engagement,
but also whether that person was
82
justified in doing so."
VI.

THE STATUTORY APPROACH

The ability of a donor to recover an antenuptial gift is
resolved via statute in a number of states. The State of New York
enacted its first of such statutes in 1935.83

80

Id. The author notes that:

81Id.
82 Id.

This approach, too, holds appeal in that it erects a relatively bright line
rule. But equating the decision to call off the wedding with "fault" is, at
best, superficial. And at worst, it induces the parties into an endless
game of chicken, where each, having lost interest in marriage, is
compelled to behave worse and worse until the other party cannot stand
it anymore and calls it quits.
With respect to the strict fault rule, Grossman points out that:

[I]nquiry inevitably enmeshes court in the complicated business of
pinpointing the cause of a failed relationship. And who is to say when a
broken engagement is justifiable?
Must such an action be based on something that makes the prospect of
marriage unimaginable -- like finding out one's fiancee is pregnant with
another man's child? Or can it be simply something that makes
marriage seem less desirable, like learning that one's fianc6e is a slob,
or discovering that the parties don't like to eat the same thing for
dinner?
The difficulty of drawing these arbitrary lines is what has pushed most
courts in the last five years toward a no-fault approach - in a trend
somewhat similar to the trend that prompted no-fault divorce. Id.
83 And enacted yet another in 1965 (Civil Rights Law § 80-b). The 1935 statute
bars a donor from recovering an antenuptial gift. See infra § VIII. However, the
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"In some states, statutes specifically regulating such
matters order the return of engagements gifts where the marriage
does not take place." 84 However, "[o]ther states have 'heartbalm'
statutes which bar rights of action for a breach of promise to marry
and prevent an individual from suing for damages for loss of social
status, prewedding expenses, and other losses occasioned by the
failure of the promised marriage to occur." 85 As noted above, such
heart balm statutes, generally, will not preclude the8 donor
from
6
recovering the gift given in contemplation of marriage.
VII.

THE LAW IN NEW YORK PRIOR TO

1935

Prior to 1935, "upon the break-up of a betrothal, the donor,
who had not been guilty of premarital wrongdoing, could initiate
an action for the return of the engagement ring." 87 The Appellate
Division, First Department held that "the termination of the
engagement by the defendant precluded her from retaining
possession of the ring." 88 This sentiment was not only expressed in
uniform fashion by the State Courts, but was echoed in the
opinions of inferior tribunals, as well. In fact, the Municipal
Court, Borough of Queens (the predecessor of the current New
York City Civil Court) noted that the issue of "[w]hether or not the
lady may maintain her ring depends entirely upon the
determination of the question as to whether the engagement was
unjustifiably breached by her act." 89 The Beck Court noted that an
engagement ring "is in the nature of a pledge for the contract of
marriage."9 °
1965 statute, as a general rule, allows a donor to recover such a gift. See infra §
IX.
84 Tomko, supra note 69 § 2a.
85 id.

Id. However, New York's heart balm statute, enacted in 1935, was construed
by the courts as barring such actions.
Goldstein, 56 Misc. 2d at 312.
88 Id. see Beck, 237 A.D. 729, 730.
89 Beer v. Hart, 153 Misc. 277, 278 (Municipal Court of N.Y., Borough of
86

Queens, Sixth Dist. 1934); citing Beck, 237 A.D. 729, 730.
9'Beck, 237 A.D. 729 at 730.
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Until Beck, "it was settled -- at least in a case where no

impediment existed to a marriage 91 -- that, if the recipient broke
the 'engagement', she was required, upon demand, to return the
ring on the theory that it constituted a conditional gift.,' 92 The
93
Beck court simply reaffirmed the common law rule of law.
While the plaintiff was denied recovery of the engagement
ring in Beck due to his premarital wrongdoing, before 1935 the
New York courts were more than willing to restore the parties to
the status quo ante where the engagement was canceled by mutual
consent. 94 In such cases, the courts found no difficulty in
justifying the return of the ring to its donor, since it could not be
said, "any so-called cancellation by mutual consent had the effect
of abrogating the condition upon which the ring was held." 95
VIII. NEW YORK'S ANTI-HEART BALM LEGISLATION: 19351965
In the years leading up to 1935, heart balm lawsuits and the
litigants and attorneys who prosecuted such actions were roundly
criticized in New York. By 1935, the public outcry to abolish such
actions had reached a fevered pitch. In fact, the actions for breach
of promise to marry, alienation of affections and criminal
conversation had so fascinated the public that feminists, lawyers,

9' This language has been criticized; see Witkowski v. Blaskiewicz, 162 Misc.

2d 66 at 67.
92 Lowe v. Quinn, 27 N.Y.2d 397 (1971); see Jacobs v. Davis, 2 K.B. 532
(1917).
93 The Beck Court went on to state that "[s]uch a ring is a symbol hallowed by
social usage. That it is a conditional gift seems inherent in its very purpose.
Possession should be retained during the engagement, which it symbolizes, and
is changed into firm ownership upon marriage. When the engagement fails, the
symbol of its existence should be returned to him who gave it." Beck, 237 A.D.
729 at 730.
94 Wilson v. Riggs, 243 A.D. 33 (1934), aff'd, 267 N.Y. 570 (1935).
95 Id. at 34.
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journalists, 96
housewives, and many others weighed in on the
controversy.

Reflecting upon the sentiment of many New Yorkers of the
day, one jurist commented that prior to the enactment of Article 2A of the Civil Practice Act, "breach of promise suits were used by
avaricious young women to mulct young men 97who were both
wealthy and rather susceptible to feminine wiles."
At least one factor that led directly to the public outcry for
the elimination of heart balm actions in New York State in 1935
was the growing resentment towards attorneys who prosecuted
such matters and earned substantial income from them. By and
large, society viewed these lawsuits as nothing more than legalized
extortion and blackmail suits, which were being instigated by
attorneys out to make a quick buck.
The public's growing discontent with these attorneys led
the organized bar, and more specifically, the Association of the Bar
of the City
of New York to examine the value of heart balm
98
lawsuits.
96

See the 1935 Bill Jacket. A New York Daily News editorial printed in March

of 1935, and entitled "Breach of Promise - Alienation of Affections - Criminal
Conversation," expressed the sentiment of many New Yorkers at that time.
According to the editorial's author:
It is hoped by a large number of people, including more reputable
lawyers that the New York Legislature at this session will see fit to
wipe out the cheap and dirty rackets described by the phrases printed as
the title of this editorial.
97 Goldstein, 56 Misc. 2d 311 at 312.
98 On March 15, 1935, attorney Reese D. Alsop, a partner with
the law firm of
Hunt, Hill & Betts, wrote a letter to Governor Herbert H. Lehman. The letter
outlined the efforts made by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
with regard to the abolition of heart balm litigation. Mr. Alsop wrote:
This year... may I appeal to you to use your good offices in aid of the
passage of either the McNaboe-Byrnes measure (supra) or the Weisman
Bills (supra).
The present effort to abolish the above causes of action - or, at least to
amend the law so as to prevent their very prevalent use for blackmail was initiated more than a year ago. A few of us - members of the Bar
- who had recently represented defendants in suits for breach of
promise of marriage, etc. (in settlement of which more than
$300,000.00 had been paid, solely to avoid the publicity of trial)

BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

Vol. XII

decided to do what we could to correct the situation. The result was a
voluntary committee consisting of the following:
Emory R. Buckner of Root, Clark, Buckner & Ballantine, George
Martin of Emmet, Marvin & Martin, Walbridge S. Taft of Cadwalader,
Wickersham & Taft, John F. Peabody of Montgomery, Peabody &
Grace, 0. Frank Reavis of Chadbourne, Stanchfield & Levy, Kenneth
Spence of Spence, Hopkins & Walser, Phillip A. Carroll of Shearman
& Sterling, Guido Pantaleoni of White & Case, Martin Taylor of Platt,
Taylor & Walker, Reese D. Alsop of Hunt, Hill & Betts
We studied the cases, obtained reports from lawyers abroad, and
discussed our various experiences with such suits.
Last April - 1934 - I, as spokesman for the group, reported our
unanimous conclusion to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, in favor of the abolition of these actions as being little better than
incitement to blackmail. The matter was referred to the Committee on
Law Reform of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
with which we were invited to cooperate for further consideration on
the subject.
In the early part of last month, I, being alternate delegate from the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York to the Convention of
the New York State Bar Association, presented the subject to the
convention, with the permission of Judge Thacher, our President, and
with the permission of Judge Kenefick, President of the State Bar
Association. The matter was referred to the State Bar Association's
Executive Committee. Opinions favorable to our own conclusions
being indicated - I think I may say - by the comments made to me by
some of the members of that Committee.
At the stated meeting of the Association of the Bar (N.Y.C.) on
February 13 h of this year, the Report of the Committee on Law Reform
was presented and approved (I am enclosing two copies of this Report);
thereupon, appropriate measures were introduced in the Legislature.
The McNaboe-Byrnes measure is modeled on the Nicholson Bill copy of which was sent to Albany by Mr. John G. Jackson, Chairman
of the Committee on Law Reform - recently passed (as I am advised by
the newspapers) in the Indiana State Legislature. The McNaboeByrnes measure has our entire approval. It wipes the slate clean.
Mr. Weisman's Bills are strictly in accord with recommendations of the
Committee on Law Reform which are not quite so sweeping. Mr.
Weisman's measures propose to abolish completely only the action for
criminal conversation (viz., actions for damages against a paramour for
a spouse's adultery) - See Weisman Bill No. 1849 - Int. 1681 - This
action was abolished in England in 1857. Next, they propose to limit
actions for alienation of affections to suits against intermeddling family
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New York State Senator John McNaboe sponsored the
controversial Senate bill. 99 Assemblyman Byrnes sponsored the
or one in loco parentis (Weisman measure No. 1849 - Int. 1681); next,
they propose to limit recovery of damages in actions for breach of
promise of marriage to expenses paid or incurred in contemplation of
the marriage (see Weisman measure No. 1848 - Int. 1680); and, finally,
I understand there is another measure designed to bring actions for
damages for breach of promise of marriage within the statute of frauds;
that is, to limit such actions to cases where the promise is in writing.
We believe the Weisman Bills will largely, if not entirely, cure the
present evils and if you feel their passage can be more readily obtained,
may we appeal to you to support them.
In conclusion, may I say that it is the unanimous opinion of our group
that very few people, whether laymen or lawyers, have any conception
of the extent to which blackmail is practise under the cloak of these
suits as they now exist. We believe their continued existence is a
disgrace to the Bar and tends to bring the Bar into serious disrepute.
Those cases in which justifiable resort to these forms of action is had
are so few as, in our opinion, not to warrant their continued existence.
These actions are a serious threat not only against the erring man frequently, if not always, quite innocent - but they also jeopardize the
happiness and [sic] wellbeing of his entire, innocent family: all for the
benefit of unscrupulous persons and their usually equally unscrupulous
counsel.
Any assistance that you can render to bring about an amendment of the
law to cure these evils will be greatly appreciated.
Letter from Reese D. Alsop, Partner, Hunt, Hill & Betts, to Governor
Herbert H. Lehman (March 15, 1935).
" S. 1508, 74' Cong. (1935). was introduced on February 25, 1935. The
corresponding Assembly bill bore Assembly Bill No. 1819, Int. 1651. After
lengthy and controversial debates, which were closely scrutinized by the public,
the McNaboe bill was passed by the New York State Senate on March 18, 1935.
Thereafter, on March 19, the McNaboe bill was delivered to the New York State
Assembly for its consideration. The Assembly passed the bill on March 20,
1935, without amendments, by a margin of 134 to 6, and it was then sent to
Governor Lehman for his approval.
100 According to a New York Times column published on March 21, 1935, and
dated March 20, 1935:
Without a murmur of debate the Assembly sent to the Governor today
the McNaboe bill, outlawing suits for breach of promise, alienation of
affections, seduction and criminal conversation. The Senate had heard
many harsh words in a long series of debates before it passed the bill
yesterday, but the Lower House sped the measure through by a vote of
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same bill in the New York State Assembly.100 A similar, albeit
watered down approach to the McNaboe bill, was
contemporaneously introduced
in the New York State Assembly
01
by Assemblyman Weisman.
Prior to the enactment of New York's 1935 anti-heart balm
legislation, it was the opinion of the New York State Legislature
that heart balm lawsuits had been "subjected to grave abuses,
causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and
pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent and free of
any wrongdoing, who were merely among the victims of
circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by
,102
unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment ....
Following the passage of the McNaboe bill, but prior to its
having been signed into law by Governor Herbert Lehman, the
New York newspaper, The Daily News, commented that the:
[B]ill's victory is a warning to women not to trust to
promises, but to performances. An engagement is
only an option, so to speak. Not all options are
taken up. Plenty of them are abandoned, without
134 to 6 .... Such swift passage of the measure by the Assembly
came as a surprise in the face of the Senate storm over the bill.
However, the Assembly has sent to the Senate for approval the two
Weisman bills, which strike at the "legal heart-balm racket," but are not
as broad in their terms as the McNaboe bill.
Assembly Votes Ban on HeartBalm Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1935.
101 Assemblyman Weisman introduced two bills on the subject, the first relating
to breach of promise actions, and the second, relating to suits for alienation of
affections. The bills were designated Assembly No. 1848, Int. 1680 and
Assembly No. 1849, Int. 1681, respectively. The lone McNaboe bill sought to
bar all heart balm related actions, whereas:
The Weisman bill on breach of promise would permit suits if promises
to marry were made in writing, but would limit damages to sums
actually spent for preparations made in contemplation of marriage.
The other Weisman measure, on suits for alienation of
affections, would bar any such claim except by fathers,
mothers, brothers or sister, and thus "triangle" suits would be
102 S.

barred. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1935.
1508, 74 th Cong. (1935).
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any punitive damages having to be paid. The
McNaboe bill puts these marriage options on the
same legal footing as other options, and properly so,
we think. So if this bill becomes law, any girl in
New York State will be wise not to consider herself
married until she10 3has the circlet on the fourth finger
of her left hand.
On March 29, 1935, New York adopted Article 2-A of the
Civil Practice Act, which became more appropriately known as the
anti-heart balm statute' °4 . Article 2-A abolished all causes of
103McNaboe

Heart Balm Bill Passes, DAILY NEWS, Mar. 21, 1935.

104 General Laws of the State of New York, Regular Session of 1935, Chapter
263, Sec. 1, at 216-17 (West).
Effective March 30, 1935, the Civil Practice Act was amended by inserting
therein a new article, identified as Article 2A. Article 2A provided the
following:
§ 61-a. Declaration of public policy of state.
The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of
actions based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal
conversation, seduction and breach of contract to marry, having been
subjected to grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance, embarrassment,
humiliation and pecuniary damage to many persons wholly innocent
and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the victims of
circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by
unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies
having furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted commission
of crime in many cases having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it
is hereby declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests
of the people of the state will be served by the abolition of such
remedies. Consequently, in the public interest, the necessity for the
enactment of this article is hereby declared as a matter of legislative
determination.
§ 61-b. Certain causes of action hereafter accruing abolished.
The rights of action heretofore existing to recover sums of money as
damage for the alienation of affections, criminal conversation,
seduction, or breach of contract to marry are hereby abolished.
§ 61-c. Certain causes of action heretofore accrued barred by lapse of
time.
1. All cause of action to recover a sum of money as damages for the
alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and
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breach of contract to marry, which have heretofore accrued, must
be commenced within sixty days after this article takes effect.
2. All actions to recover a sum of money for a breach of a presently
existing contract to marry must be commence within sixty days
after the cause of action has accrued.
3. All such actions not so commenced shall be thereafter completely
and forever barred for lapse of time.
§ 61 -d. Legal effect of certain acts hereafter occurring.
No act hereafter done within this state shall operate to give rise, either
within or without this state, to any of the rights of action abolished by
this article. No contract to marry, hereafter made or entered into in this
state shall operate to give rise, either within or without this state, to any
cause or right of action for the breach thereof.
§ 61-e. Certain actions and proceedings with respect to causes of action
abolished or barred by this article prohibited.
It shall hereafter be unlawful for any person, either as a party or
attorney, or an agent or other person in behalf of either, to file or serve,
cause to be filed or served or threaten to file or serve, or to threaten to
cause to be filed or served, any process or pleading, in any court of the
state, setting forth or seeking to recover a sum of money upon any
cause of action abolished or barred by this article, whether such cause
or action arose within or without the state.
§ 61-f. Certain contracts void as against public policy.
All contracts and instruments of every kind, name, nature or
description, which may hereafter be executed within this state in
payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any claim or cause
of action abolished or barred by this article, whether such claim or
cause of action arose within or without this state, are hereby declared to
be contrary to the public policy of this state and absolutely void. It
shall be unlawful to cause, induce or procure any person to execute
such a contract or instrument; or cause, induce or procure any person to
give, pay, transfer or deliver any money or thing of value in payment,
satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any such claim or cause of
action; or to receive, take or accept any such money or thing of value as
such payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise. It shall be
unlawful to commence or cause to be commenced, either as party or
attorney, or as agent or otherwise in behalf of either, in any court of this
state, any proceeding or action seeking to enforce or recover upon any
such contract or instrument, knowing it to be such, whether the same
shall have been executed within or without this state; provided,
however, that this section shall not apply to the payment, satisfaction,
settlement or compromise of any causes of action which are not
abolished or barred by this article, or any contracts or instruments
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action to recover sums of money as damage for breach of contract
to marry, 10 5 and provided that no contract to marry will operate to
give rise to any cause or right of action for breach thereof. 0 6 The

heretofore executed, or to the bona fide holder in due course of any
negotiable instrument which may be hereafter executed.
§ 61 -g. Penalties for violation.
Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this article shall
be guilty of a felony which shall be punishable by a fine of not less than
one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment for a term of not less than one year nor more than five
years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.
§ 61-h. Construction of article.
This article shall be liberally construed to effectuate the objects and
purposes thereof and the public policy of the state as hereby declared.
If any clause, sentence or paragraph or part of this article shall for any
reason be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid,
such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder
thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence or
paragraph or part thereof, directly involved in the controversy in which
such judgment shall have been rendered. If the application of this
article, or any part thereof, to any person or circumstances shall be
adjudged by such court to be invalid or ineffectual for any reason, such
judgment shall not affect the application of such article or part to any
other person or circumstances.
§ 61-i. Inconsistent laws superseded.
This article shall supersede all acts and parts of acts, inconsistent with
this article, to the extent of such inconsistency, but in all other respects
shall be deemed supplemental to such acts and parts of acts. Nothing
contained in this article shall be construed as a repeal of any provisions
of the penal law or the code of criminal procedure or of ay other law of
this state relating to criminal or quasi-criminal actions or proceedings.
In 1962, §§ 61-a through 61-i of Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act were
modified when the Civil Practice Ace was abolished and the Civil Practice Law
and Rules was implemented by the New York State Legislature. These former
sections of law were re-designated §§ 80 through 85 of the New York Civil
Rights Law.
105 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT, § 61-b (1935).
106 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT, § 61-d (1935).
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was clearly set
purpose and intent of the anti-heart balm statute
07
forth in section 61-a of the Civil Practice Act. 1
Upon signing the McNaboe bill into law, Governor
10 8
Lehman issued a memo expressing his support for the measure.
Not long after the enactment of Article 2-A, courts of the
day began to hear cases involving section 61 of the Civil Practice
Act. While given the opportunity to limit the scope of section
61109, the judiciary declined to do so and, instead, construed
section 61 as barring actions for the recovery of "breach of
real or
promise to marry, [as well as] suits to recover specific
' 110
personal property given in contemplation of marriage."
As noted previously, prior to 1935, the court had allowed
for the recovery of an engagement ring or its value based upon the
107

The remedies heretofore provided by law for the enforcement of actions

based upon alleged alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction and
breach of contract to marry, having been subjected to grave abuses, causing
extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage to many
persons wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who were merely the
victims of circumstances, and such remedies having been exercised by
unscrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment, and such remedies having
furnished vehicles for the commission or attempted commission of crime and in
many cases having resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as
the public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will
be served by the abolition of such remedies. Consequently, in the public
interest, the necessity for the enactment of this article is hereby declared as a
matter of legislative determination. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, § 61-a (1935).
108 According to the Governor:
I am glad to sign this bill which abolishes the right to bring court
actions to recover sums of money as damages for alienation of
affection, seduction and breach of contract to marry. The public is well
acquainted with the many abuses that have arisen in the prosecution or
threats of prosecutions of this type of action. For years these actions
have been used to extract large sums of money without proper
justification. I wish to point out, of course, that this bill does not in any
way curtail or eliminate the provisions of the penal law. 1935 Bill
jacket at 17.
109 By preserving the right of a donor to recover gifts given in contemplation
(where marriage does not ensue).
110 Gaden v. Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80, 85 (N.Y. 1971); see Andie, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429;
see also Josephson, 266 A.D. 992.
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However,
theory of mutual rescission of the contract to marry.'
the
enactment
following
decided
after the first crop of cases were
all
of article 2A, it was clear that the New York Courts deemed
112
Act.
Practice
Civil
the
of
contravention"
"in
actions
such
Judges and legal commentators alike criticized this
result. 13 In fact one such commentator exclaimed that whereas
"[t]he weapon of the 'gold digger' under the old law was the action
for breach of promise. Now, every deceiver.., has a new weapon.
It is the promise to marry."' 1 4 The dissent in Andie, also noted that
to deny recovery to the donor of a gift given in contemplation of
marriage supports the unjust enrichment of the defendant.15
"Instead of suing for breach of promise, a resourceful
young woman would simply persuade her swain to shower her
with gifts in anticipation of marriage, which she herself would then
reject."'116

This criticism continued for more than a decade, when, in
1947, the New York State Law Revision Commission, in an
attempt to rectify the broad construction of New York's anti-heart
balm law, 117 proposed an amendment 118 to the existing law. 119 In
111 Grishen v. Domagalski, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 484 (N.Y 1948).
112 Id. at 485.
113 See Bruno v. Guerra, 549 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1990); see v. Easley v. Neal, 110

N.Y.S.2d (1952); note, Breach of Contract to Marry; New York Civil Practice
Act, Article 2-A: Recovery of Antenuptial Gifts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1962);
note, The Heart Balm Act and Antenuptial Gifts, 13 BROOKLYN L. REV. 174
(1947); see, e.g., Abrahams, Return of Engagement Rings in New York,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 4, 1963, p. 4; Markewich, Take Back Your Ring, Sir!, N.Y.
County Lawyer's Bar Bull, March 19, 1949, p. 23; Gribben, Quasi-Contract:
Gifts; Effects of New York Anti-Heart Balm Statute, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 401
(1944).
114 Tushnet, supra note 4, at 2594, citing W.J. BROCKELBANK, The Nature of a
Promise to Marry - A Study in Comparative Law (pt. 2), 41 ILL. L. REV. 199,
207-08 (1946).
115 See Goldstein, 56 Misc. 2d at 312.
116 Id. at 505.
117Specifically, with respect to the bar of actions to recover gifts given in

contemplation of marriage.
118The bill was introduced in the New York State Assembly on January 9, 1947
and was subsequently approved by the Assembly. N.Y. Law Rev. Comm.,
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addition to submitting such amendment, the Law Revision
Commission also submitted to the New York State Legislature a
twenty-three page report 12 recommending enactment of the
amendment.
Report 237 at 227 (1947); N.Y. Legis. Doc., 1947, No. 65(J); Sen. Int. No. 116,
Pr. No. 116, Assem. int. No. 120, Pr. No. 120.
The Senate bill, Int. 116, Pr. 116, was introduced by State Senator Young and
was subsequently approved by the Senate.
Assemblyman Malcolm Wilson, then Chairman of the Assembly Codes
Committee sponsored the Asssembly bill. As an aside, Assemblyman Wilson
later served as Lieutenant Governor of New York State for fifteen years under
Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. During his tenure as Lieutenant Governor,
Wilson saw Governor Rockefeller sign into law Civil Rights Law § 80-b. Upon
Governor Rockefeller's resignation in 1973, Malcolm Wilson was appointed
Governor of the State of New York. He served as Governor until 1974, at which
time he was defeated in the New York State gubernatorial race by Hugh Carey.
Yet another point of interest concerning Assemblyman Wilson's 1947 bill
relates to a letter Wilson sent to Governor Dewey's chief counsel, Charles D.
Breitel, on March 18, 1947. In the letter, Assemblyman Wilson gently reminded
Mr. Breitel, that his bill was "await[ing] action by the Governor." Veto jacket,
1947, Assembly Int. 120, Veto No. Memo # 46. In 1966, Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller appointed Charles D. Breitel Judge of the New York State Court of
Appeals. Thereafter, Breitel served as the Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals from 1973 to 1979.
119 The proposed amendment was to be inserted into Article 2-A of the Civil
Practice Act and designated as § 61-j and § 2. The proposed amendment read as
follows:
§ 61-j. This article shall not be deemed to prevent a court in a proper
case from granting restitution for property or money transferred in
contemplation of the performance of an agreement to marry which is
not performed.
N.Y. Civ. PRACTICE ACT §§ 61-j, 2, S.65(J), at 227 (N.Y. 1947).
120 The report submitted to the New York State Legislature
was entitled "Act,
Recommendation and Study relating to Restitution for Property transferred in
Contemplation of Marriage." N.Y. Law Rev. Comm., Report 238 at 225 (1947).
121 According to the Law Revision Commission:
This is an amendment recommended by the Law Revision Commission
....
Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act, which outlaws actions to
recover damages for breach of contract to marry, has been interpreted
to bar actions for restitution where property or money has been
transferred in contemplation of marriage. The purpose of this bill is to
enable the courts, in a proper case, to grant restitution. Id. at 227.
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Ultimately, however, Governor John Dewey successfully
vetoed the amendment122 proposed by the New York State Law
Revision Commission.
Following the enactment of section 61, and prior to New
York's repeal of the bar on actions seeking to recover gifts given in
contemplation of marriage, at least one court in1 23New York refused
to construe section 61 in such a liberal fashion.
The Unger court held that section 61-b of the Civil Practice
Act did not bar an action by a donor to recover an engagement ring
where the parties had mutually consented to abandon their
engagement.
While the court acknowledged that "since the
enactment of section 61-b of the Civil Practice Act, it has been
determined that where the contract of marriage was breached, the
Furthermore, with respect to Article 2-A of the Civil Rights Law, the
Commission stated that:
The aim of the Act was to do away with excessive claims for damages
coercive by their very nature and, all too frequently, fraudulent in
character. Denial of recovery of property transferred in contemplation
of marriage is not necessary to the accomplishment of this object, and it
has the undesirable result of placing it within the power of a recipient to
renounce a promise and yet retain property bestowed in anticipation of
performance. Id. at 229.
In an effort to illustrate the inequity of Article 2-A, the Commission referred to
the lower court's decision in the case of Morris v. Baird, 54 N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Nassau County 1945). In quoting the opinion of Justice Lockwood, the
Commission stated that:
If judicial construction of the statute is further extended to bar this
action, then the statute, which was designed to prevent unjust
enrichment of unscrupulous persons and to avoid perpetrations of
frauds, would become an instrument to accomplish just that purpose,
and would deprive the court of its inequitable power to afford redress to
one who has been deprived of the property by fraud and deceit.
Such a shocking result could not have been the intention of the
Legislature in enacting Article 2A, Civil Practice Act, nor will the best
interests of the People of the State be served thereby.
122 Governor Dewey vetoed the bill on March 25, 1947, and the New York State
Legislature failed to override such veto. Accordingly, § 61-j was never
incorporated into Article 2-A of the Civil Practice Act. N.Y. Civ. PRACTICE
ACT art. 2A.
123 See Unger, 180 Misc. 381.
124Id.
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donor cannot recover the ring, and that such action was barred as
one for damages, based upon a breach of contract to marry... ,,125
in a surprising twist, the Unger court boldly concluded "[t]he
instant action is not one based either on the contract to marry, or on
a breach thereof. Consequently, the complaint states a cause of
action which is not barred by section 61-b of the Civil Practice
26

Act."'

1

Other courts of the era were, however, not as daring as the
Unger court.1 27 In Herbst, plaintiff, as assignee of his brother,
sued to recover a ring or the monetary value thereof. Plaintiffs
assignor maintained that the ring was given to the defendant
"neither as a gift nor as an engagement ring, but for the purpose of
showing her parents her future wedding ring." The defendant,
however, contended that the ring was given in contemplation of
marriage, and accordingly, the plaintiff's assignee's action was
barred as a matter of law.' 28 The court summarily dismissed the
case, holding that since the action was based
upon a promise of
129
maintained.
be
not
could
suit
the
marriage,
It is evident from the decision of at least one lower court at
the time that there was considerable uneasiness amongst jurists, as
well as legislators, regarding the application of section 61 of the
Civil Practice Act.13° In Grishen, the plaintiff sued to "recover an
engagement ring or its value, claiming a failure of consideration as
the result of a mutual rescission131of the contract to marry which was
the consideration for the gift.'
Reflecting upon the court's decision in the Andie case, the
Grishen court noted that Andie "was the test suit establishing a
precedent against the restoration of the status quo of decent people,
who for reasons of incompatibility wish to terminate a marriage

125

126

Id. at 382, see also Andie, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429.

Id.at 383.
127See Herbst v. Schuster, 81 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1st Dept.
1948).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See
131id.

Grishen, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 484.
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contract."'1 32 The Grishen court acknowledged that plaintiffs
"position" in Andie "did not particularly lend itself to the
conscience of the court."' 1 3 3
More specifically, it seemed
was denied recovery 134
plaintiff
that
fact
the
with
uncomfortable
even though he "sought to recover 135
from a paramour with whom he
had been living in illicit relations."
Though the Grishen court seemed poised to ignore the
restrictions imposed by section 61 of the Civil Practice Act,1 36 it
resigned itself to the inevitable 137 and acknowledged that there
"seems to be no doubt ... that the law, as presently construed by
138
our appellate courts, would bar this type of action."
By 1951, it was abundantly clear that the New York State
Judiciary was unwilling to narrow the application of section 61 of
the Civil Practice Act 39 and that legislative action would be
necessary to effect change. 140
In Nosonowitz, the court acknowledged that prior to the
enactment of section 61, "a donor could recover an engagement
ring after a mutual cancellation or rescission of the contract to
marry."' 14 1 The Nosonowitz court also noted that section 61 would

appear only to bar claims by the unscrupulous and not claims of
"an honest person seeking restoration of property after a ... breach

142
or a mutual cancellation of the engagement to marry."
However, the court went on to acknowledge that the "weight of
authorities now sustains a broader interpretation of the spirit and

the public policy of the statute ...

so as to prohibit all types and

"2Id. at 485.
133 Id.
134 Presumably
135

136
137

as a result of the enactment of § 61 of the Civil Practice Act.

Id.
As well as cases such as Andie, 32 N.Y.S.2d 429.
And, in fact did not reach the merits of the case, since the law of the case had

been determined below.
138 Grishen v. Domagalski, 80 N.Y.S.2d 484 (N.Y. City Ct. 1948).
139 Specifically, with regard to the return of gifts given in contemplation of
marriage.
140 See Nosonowitz v. Kahn, 106 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Mun. Ct., 1951).
141 Id.

142 Id. at 838.
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forms of action growing out of or arising out of an agreement
to
143
marry irrespective of the grounds alleged for the recovery."'

IX.

NEW YORK'S MODIFIED ANTI-HEART BALM
LEGISLATION FROM 1965 TO THE PRESENT: THE COMMON LAW
REVISITED?

Finally, amidst the criticisms of jurists and legislators alike,
in 1965 the New York State Legislature enacted New York Civil
Rights Law section 80-b. 144 The amendment took more than
twenty years to pass following the enactment of the anti-heart balm
law, succeeding a few years before no-fault divorce laws began to
sweep the nation. 145 The measure was sponsored
in the New York
46
1
Bookson.
P.
Paul
Senator
by
Senate
State
143Id.

'44McKinney's 1965 Session Law of New York, Chapters 1 to 1074, Chapter
333, p. 488 (West):
An Act to amend the civil rights law, in relation to gifts made in contemplation
of marriage. Approved June 7, 1965, effective September 1, 1965.
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do
enact as follows:
§ 2. Such law is hereby amended by adding thereto a new section, to be section
eighty-b, to read as follows:
§ 80-b. Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to bar a right of
action for the recovery of a chattel, the return of money for securities, or the
value thereof at the time of such transfer, or the rescission of a deed to real
property when the sole consideration for the transfer of the chattel, money or
securities or real property was a contemplated marriage which has not occurred,
and the court may, if in its discretion justice so requires, (1) award the defendant
a lien upon the chattel, securities or real property for monies expended in
connection therewith or improvements thereto, (2) deny judgment for the
recovery of the chattel or securities or for rescission of the deed and award
money damages in lieu thereof.
§ 3. This act shall take effect September first, nineteen hundred sixty-five.
145 Tushnet, supra note 4 at 2596.
146 The bill was introduced in the Senate on March 9, 1965 under Senate Int.
2587, Pr. 2706, 5037. The corresponding Assembly was designated bill number
No. 6774, Int. No.232 and was sponsored by Assemblyman Noah Goldstein.
After both houses of the Legislature approved the measure, Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller signed Chapter 333 into law on June 7, 1965. Thereafter, Civil
Rights Law § 80-b became effective on September 1, 1965. New York
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Rather suddenly, New York Civil Rights Law section 80-b
reversed the direction of the existing law by allowing the donor of
an antenuptial gift to recover such gift 4 7 from a donee upon the
dissolution of their engagement. Despite such reversal, section 80b did not lift the 1935 bar against actions for breach of contract to
marry, alienation of affection or criminal conversation.
The Bookson and Goldstein bills 14 8 were not without their
critics, however. The Association of the Bar of the City of New
May 19, 1965, expressed its reservations
York149 , in a memo dated
50
concerning the bills. 1

Assembly Journal, 188th Session, 1965, Vol.2, pgs 2638-2639 (Williams Press,
Inc.); McKinney's 1965 Session Law of New York, Chapters 1 to 1074, Chapter
333, p. 4 8 8 (West).
In his memorandum in support of the bill, Senator Bookson directly addressed
the measures previously taken by the New York State Courts (after 1935) to
insure that § 61 of the Civil Practice Act (and later § 80 of the Civil Rights Law)
bar actions for the recovery of antenuptial gifts where marriage does not ensue,
in addition to barring actions for breach of contract to marry, alienation of
affection and criminal conversation.
Section 80 of the civil rights law [formerly § 61 of the Civil Practice
Act] abolishes rights of action for alienation of affection and for breach
of contract to marry, etc. The statute as thus worded has been
construed to outlaw actions to recover engagement rings or other real or
personal. We do not believe that this was the intent of the legislature
since an engagement ring does not necessarily constitute a contract to
marry.
Permitting the donee of gifts made in contemplation of a marriage
which does not take place to retain same is inequitable and appears to
be beyond the intent of present section 80. (Emphasis added). 1965
Bill Jacket, Chapter 333, pg. 2.
147 Or the value thereof.
M See note 147.
149 The body whose actions led to the introduction of the McNaboe-Byrnes bills
some thirty years prior.
150 In advocating a fault based approach to the issue at hand, Alvin H. Schulman,
Chairman of the Association's Committee on State Legislation stated:
The purpose of the bill is remove whatever impediment may exist to
the recovery of gifts obviously made in contemplation of marriage,
where the marriage has not occurred. This aim is an excellent one.
The statutory bar to actions for breach of promise does not, in terms,
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It should be noted that a minor amendment to New York
Civil Rights Law section 80-b was enacted by the New York State
Legislature in 1970.151

bar a recovery of gifts made in contemplation of marriage, but some
judges have so interpreted it....
However, the proposed bill goes too far. It does not confine its
operation to cases in which the proposed defendant in an action to
recover the gift is the person who broke the engagement. There would
appear to be no just reason why an innocent and wronged party, whose
engagement was broken against his or her wishes, should be required to
return gifts made in contemplation of marriage. Although the bill
provdes that the action of the court is "in its discretion" if "justice so
requires" we do not deem this phrase sufficient protection for the
wronged party. A court might, if in its discretion "justice so requires",
base the exercise of that discretion upon the size of the gift or other
factors not involved in the termination of the engagement. A statute
permitting a suit for the recovery of gifts made in contemplation of
marriage, where the marriage has not occurred, should be premised
upon a requirement that the proof establish the wrongful termination of
an engagement or the wrongful prevention of the occurrence of a
marriage by the defendant. Such a statute should also provide that the
word "wrongful" be interpreted to include a situation in which the
defendant in a suit to recover a gift was incapable of marriage, for
example, by reason of a legal impediment to the marriage, such as the
existence of a legal spouse.
Memorandum from Alvin H. Shulman, Chairman of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York on State Legislation, to Hon. Sol Neil Corbin (May 19,
1965).
151 The amendment was introduced in the New York State Assembly
on January
7, 1970 by Assemblyman Thorp as A.266. Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
signed the amendment into law on April 24, 1970. According to the sponsor's
memorandum accompanying the bill, A.266:
Corrects a typographical error in section 80-b of the Civil Rights Law
by changing the word "for" to "or" on line 6, page 1 of the bill.
The section should clearly use the word "or" throughout as it does on
page 1, lines 8 and 11 and on page 2, line 2.
While the proposed typographical correction appears to be trivial the
inaccurate use of the word "for" instead of "or" created an ambiguity
and has, in at least one instance, resulted in litigation. 1970 Bill Jacket.
Interestingly, this error was noted by New York State Attorney General Louis J.
Lefkowitz five years earlier. Following receipt of the Senate bill in 1965,
Lefkowitz issued a memo to the Governor finding "no legal objection to th[e]
bill," and noting that "[l]ine 8 should read 'money or securities'...." Despite
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After the dramatic shift in New York's law governing the
return of antenuptial gifts, the courts found a "strong presumption
of law that any gifts made during an engagement period are given
solely in consideration of marriage, and are recoverable if the
marriage does not materialize."' 152 The rule was defended on the
ground that it upheld "the overwhelming public policy against
public trials
of heart-wounding tribulations of formerly engaged
53
1

parties.'

X.

No-FAULT BASED RECOVERY UNDER NEW YORK
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 80-B: THE GADEN CASE

One commentator has noted that:
In dealing with fault as related to broken
engagements, American courts have borrowed nofault concepts from divorce law. 154 Before the mid-

twentieth century, most states would not allow a
divorce unless one party could prove some
impropriety on the part of their spouse.1 55 However,
as the disposition toward marriage and divorce
began transforming, many states advocated a

change in legislation and began to phase out faultthe Lefkowitz memo, Governor Rockefeller signed the bill into law with the
flawed language. 1965 Bill Jacket pg. 3.
152 107 YALE L.J. 2583 at 2596-97 (quoting Friedman v. Geller, 368 N.Y.S.2d
980, 981 (Civ. Ct. 1975)).
153
Id. at 2597 (quoting Friedman, 368 N.Y.S.2d 980, 982).
154 Grossman, supra note 13. See, e.g., Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 854
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (determining that "the concept of no fault
divorce must have as its predicate the concept of no fault engagements"); Vigil
v. Haber, 888 P.2d 455, 457 (N.M. 1994) (finding that according to "a modem
trend, legislatures and courts have moved toward a policy that removes faultfinding from the personal-relationship dynamics of marriage and divorce");
Brown v. Thomas, 379 N.W.2d 868, 873-74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (paralleling
divorces with broken engagements and reasoning that the public policy
preference for no-fault divorce should logically be extended to encompass
broken engagements).
155
Id.; see Elrod, infra note 156, § 9.011, at 9-3.
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156

Id. Discussing the preference for no-fault divorces, Professor Linda Henry

Elrod noted:
Divorce reforms in many states placed comprehensive jurisdiction over
family law matters in family courts and moved to eliminate fault from
the law of divorce. The goal of no-fault divorce was to eliminate from
the courtroom the detailing of all the "horribles" either spouse had
committed during the marriage, especially if the divorce was mutually
agreeable. Id.
In 1969, California adopted "irreconcilable differences" as the first nofault grounds for divorce in any state. Id.
However, at the present time there are some signs that indicate that
fault-based divorce may be beginning to make a comeback in state
legislatures. Peter N. Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factorsin No-Fault
Divorce, 31 FAM.L.Q. 269, 272 (1997). In fact, commentators have
noted that the "no-fault divorce revolution over the past thirty years has
developed some very serious shortcomings," including inadequate
economic support for "women and children of divorce," psychological
problems for children which perpetuate beyond the divorce
proceedings, and damage to America's fiscal environment. Id. at 27174. Swisher notes that alarmingly high divorce rates have many states,
namely Michigan, reexamining current no-fault divorce statutes. Id. at
272-73 n.18. "Though none of the bills [in the state legislatures] are yet
near passage, the issue has caught fire among feminists, religious
groups, men's advocates, lawyers, and the Americans whose first
marriage--up to half--is projected to end in divorce." Id. (citing John
Leland, Tightening the Knot: Convinced that Single-parentFamilies
are Bad for Everyone, Some Lawmakers Want to End No-fault Divorce,
Newsweek, Feb. 19, 1996, at 72.
Also reflecting this trend is Louisiana, which requires a couple
choosing a covenant marriage to prove fault before obtaining a divorce.
Terry Carter, 'She Done Me Wrong,' A.B.A. J., Oct. 1997, at 24. The
Louisiana law, which strongly promotes and supports the traditional
notions of commitment in marriage, describes the covenant marriage as
follows:
§ 272. Covenant marriage; intent; conditions to create.
A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one male and one
female who understand and agree that the marriage between them is a
lifelong relationship. Parties to a covenant marriage have received
counseling emphasizing the nature and purposes of marriage and the
responsibilities thereto. Only when there has been a complete and total
breach of the marital covenant commitment may the non-breaching
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party seek a declaration that the marriage is no longer legally
recognized.
A man and woman may contract a covenant marriage by declaring their
intent to do so on their application for a marriage license, as provided
in R.S. 9:224(C), and executing a declaration of intent to contract a
covenant marriage, as provided in R.S. 9:273. The application for a
marriage license and the declaration of intent shall be filed with the
official who issues the marriage license.
1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 273 (West). See also 1997 La. Sess. Law
Serv. 224, 273-75 (West) for a more complete description of the
requirements and the "declaration of intent" of the covenant marriage.
With the covenant marriage comes the limitation of divorce. The intent
of the legislature to dissuade divorce and promote the subsistence of the
marriage institution is obvious in the following law, which states in
part:
§ 307. Divorce or separation from bed and board in a covenant
marriage; exclusive grounds.
A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary and subsequent to the
parties obtaining counseling, a spouse to a covenant marriage may
obtain a judgment of divorce only upon proof of any of the following:
(1) The other spouse has committed adultery.
(2) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to
death or imprisonment at hard labor.
(3) The other spouse has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for a
period of one year and constantly refuses to return.
(4) The other spouse has physically or sexually abused the spouse
seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses.
(5) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously
without reconciliation for a period of two years.
(6)(a) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously
without reconciliation for a period of one year from the date the
judgment of separation from bed and board was signed.
(b) If there is a minor child or children of the marriage, the spouses
have been living separate and apart continuously without reconciliation
for a period of one year and six months from the date the judgment of
separation from bed and board was signed; however, if abuse of a child
of the marriage or a child of one of the spouses is the basis for which
the judgment of separation from bed and board was obtained, then a
judgment of divorce may be obtained if the spouses have been living
separate and apart continuously without reconciliation for a period of
one year from the date the judgment of separation from bed and board
was signed.
1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 307 (West).
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In Gaden, the Court of Appeals held that fault was
irrelevant under Civil Rights Law section 80-b, which
contemplates situations where one party has directly transferred
property to another as well as situations where the transfer was
made by a third party to both of the parties. The Court rejected the
view that section 80-b merely removed the impediment to such
actions that had developed as a result of its previous interpretation
of the heart balm statute and restored the common-law right of
recovery in 57 which fault was considered relevant to the
controversy.
The Court maintained that just as the question of fault or
guilt has become largely irrelevant to modem divorce proceedings,
so should it also be deemed irrelevant to the breaking of the
engagement. The purpose of section 80-b was to return the parties
to the position they were in prior to their becoming engaged,
without rewarding or punishing either party for the fact that the
marriage failed to materialize. 158
157

See Joel R. Brandes, The Return of Engagement Gifts, New York Divorce

and Family Law (1998), at httm://www.brandeslaw.com/engagementgifts/
102798c4.htm.
'58 Id. The parties in Gaden were married in 1953 and divorced in May of 1960.
In July of 1960, they resumed living together with the expectation that they
would ultimately remarry. They continued to live together, without remarrying,
until the spring of 1962, when plaintiff and the couple's daughter moved away.
Prior to that, defendant entered a contract to purchase premises in Islip. In
conjunction with this transaction, it was necessary for the defendant to obtain a
mortgage commitment for $25,000.
At closing, title to the property was vested, at the request of the defendant, in the
names of "Elmer Gaden Jr. and Dorothy J. Gaden, his wife." The bond and
mortgage given to the bank for the loan extended was executed by both parties,
and the difference in cash ($13,000) required to close the deal was furnished by
the defendant. Subsequently, title to a vacant lot contiguous to the purchased
premises was similarly acquired in both names for $5,000, $300 of which was
advanced by defendant; the balance was obtained by a loan from his father.
In June 1962, after plaintiff had moved out of the premises, both parties signed a
promissory note for the $5,200 loan used for the purchase of this second parcel
of land. In December 1967, plaintiff, as tenant in common, commenced an
action for part of both parcels. Defendant counterclaimed for the imposition of a
constructive trust and for rescission, based on a claim that the creation of the
tenancy in common was a gift conditioned on remarriage of the parties.
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Prior to 1935, much was made over the issue of premarital
wrongdoing and/or fault. 159 But times change, and people change
- by 1971, six years following the enactment of section 80-b, the
New York State Court of Appeals consciously and quite
deliberately moved away from a6 1fault based analysis 60 and,
adopted a no-fault based approach.'
In reflecting the sentiment of the times, the Gaden Court
acknowledged that "[i]n truth, in most broken engagements there is
no real fault as such - one or both of the parties merely changes his
162
mind about the desirability of the other as a marriage partner,"'
and that, particularly in an age of no-fault divorce,
placing blame
63
for the end of an engagement [is] inappropriate. 1
As in many other jurisdictions, the no-fault approach, as
implemented by the Gaden Court, has come to dominate the
landscape of New York case law. 164
In Leshowitz, the plaintiff merely demonstrated that he
gave an engagement ring to the defendant in contemplation of their
marriage.
In affirming the lower court's decision in favor of the
plaintiff, the court made no mention as to the cause66of termination
of the engagement between plaintiff and defendant. 1
In Mancuso, the plaintiff had contributed virtually all of the
funds toward the purchase of a piece of real estate. This property
was then given to the defendant as a gift in contemplation of
marriage. 167 The court held that "[s]ince the marriage never took
place, the conveyance of the property to the plaintiff would satisfy
After a trial, Special Term found that §80-b of the Civil Rights Law was
applicable and directed plaintiff to deliver to the defendant a deed of her interest
in the parcels, provided she would be released from liability on the bond and
note that were used to buy the parcels.
159 See Goldstein, 56 Misc. 2d at 312.
160 With the exception of Lowe and its progeny. Lowe, 27 N.Y.2d 397.
161See Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d 80.
162Id. at 88; Kobar, supra note 15 at 2597 n.68.
163 Id.

164Id.;
165Id.
166Id.;

167

see Leshowitz v. Conklin, 245 A.D.2d 343 (2d Dept. 1997).

see Mancuso v. Russo, 132 A.D.2d 533 (2d Dept. 1987).
Mancuso, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
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the clear purpose of section 80-b [and] ... return the parties to the
position they were in prior to becoming engaged, without
either party for the fact that the marriage
rewarding or punishing
16
failed to materialize.' 8
Since Gaden, at least one court has explicitly
acknowledged that "fault for the breakup of the engagement ' 169 is
a non-issue. In Gagliardo,the court acknowledged that the issue
of fault is "wholly irrelevant"' 170 with respect to plaintiff s ability to
recover possession of an engagement ring that he concededly gave
in contemplation of marriage.
XI.

THE LOWE ANOMOLY

Despite the Gaden Court's advocacy of a no-fault based
approach to the return of antenuptial gifts, approximately five
months earlier the very same court, in Lowe, held that plaintiff, a
168
169

Id.
Gagliardo v. Clemente, 180 A.D.2d 551 (1st Dept. 1992).

170 id.
171

172

id.
Plaintiff, a married man, sued for the return of a diamond "engagement" ring

that he gave the defendant on her promise to marry him when and if he became
free. He had been living apart from his wife for several years and they
contemplated a divorce. About a month after receiving the ring, the defendant
told the plaintiff that she had "second thoughts" about the matter and had
decided against getting married. When he requested the return of the ring, she
suggested that he "talk to [her] lawyer." He brought an action to recover the ring
or, in the alternative, $60,000, its asserted value.
The Lowe Court noted that an engagement ring is in the nature of a pledge for
the contract of marriage and, under the common law, it was settled that where no
impediment existed to a marriage, if the recipient broke the engagement, she
was required on demand to return the ring, on the theory that it constituted a
conditional gift.
The Court concluded in Lowe that a different result was compelled where one of
the parties is married, because an agreement to marry under such circumstances
is void as against public policy, and it is not saved or rendered valid by the fact
that the married individual contemplated divorce and that the agreement was
conditioned on procurement of the divorce. Based on such reasoning, it held that
a plaintiff may not recover the engagement ring or any other property he may
have given the woman.
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married man, was not entitled to the return of a diamond
engagement ring, which he gave the defendant upon her promise
to
173
wed him when he obtained a divorce and was free to marry.
This decision resurrected the common law restriction
placed upon the "married donor ' 174 that
was acknowledged by the
75
Beck court thirty-eight years earlier.'
One legal scholar has commented that the Lowe court acted
"in a moment of moral hyperactivity, [and] imposed the
questionable qualification on section 80-b that if the engagement
was against public policy because the fiancee knew the object of
his affections was a married woman, she was entitled to the loot of
a $60,000 diamond
ring, regardless of who broke the illicit
176
engagement."'
As in Beck, the Lowe court drew a moral line in the sand,
holding that where one of the parties is married at the time of
engagement, the agreement to marry is void as against public
policy. The court also noted that such agreement to marry was not
rendered valid merely because: (1) the married plaintiff
contemplated divorce and; (2) the agreement
to marry was
77
conditioned upon his procurement of a divorce. 1
In a scathing dissent, the minority in Lowe noted that they
were called upon to determine whether a married man, awaiting
the dissolution of a prior marriage, might maintain an action to
recover an engagement ring given in contemplation of a
subsequent marriage to one fully aware of his present incapacity to
The Court also pointed out that §80-b of the Civil Rights Law had to be read in
connection with §80-a, which effected the abolition of actions for breach of
promise to marry. Section 80-b was added to make it clear that a man not under
any impediment to marry was entitled to the return of articles that he gave the
woman, even though breach of promise suits had been abolished as against
public policy. This statute, however, did not alter the settled principle denying a
right of recovery where either of the parties to the proposed marriage is already
married. Lowe, 27 N.Y.2d 397 at 399-402.
173Id.

174 To
175
176
177

reaquire an antenuptial gift upon the termination of an engagement.
See Lowe, 27 N.Y.2d 397; see Jacobs, 2 K.B. 532.
Brandes, supra note 157.
See Lowe, 27 N.Y.2d 397; see Jacobs, 2 K.B. 532.
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contract a second marriage. 178
According to the dissenting justices, while the court had yet
to construe section 80-b of the Civil Rights Law provision, it was
apparent that the section upon which the plaintiff, in part, relied,
does not create a new cause of action, 179 but merely removes the
impediment which, for a time, had prevented a man from suing for
the return of a ring which he allegedly delivered 1to
a defendant as a
80
pledge or token of a mutual agreement to marry.
The Lowe dissenters further maintained that an engagement
181
ring "is in the nature of a pledge for the contract of marriage,"
and under the common law it was settled that where the donee
broke the engagement she was required, upon demand, to return
the ring to her suitor on the theory that it constituted a conditional
gift. 82
Finally, the Lowe dissent concluded that:
The plaintiffs action in restitution was not brought
to enforce an illegal contract or to further an illegal
relation. The agreement to marry was at an end and
the action simply attempts to prevent the
defendant's unjust enrichment. The illegal contract
to marry relates only indirectly and remotely to the
relief sought, it is a thing of the past and is
collateral. The plaintiff vis-A-vis the defendant is
guilty of no wrongdoing; he simply seeks the return
of what is rightfully his. The court would not be
sanctioning the illegal act of a married man in
becoming engaged to a third party. That
engagement is at an end and the return of the ring
would in no way revive or foster the former plan.
Indeed, it only points the way to the restoration of
the status quo ante. As it stands, by allowing the
178 Id.
'9See

180See

Goldstein, 56 Misc. 2d at 312.

Josephson, 266 A.D. 992.
See Beck, 237 A.D. 729, 730.
182 See Wilson v. Riggs, 243 A.D. 33, 34.
181
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defendant to retain the ring the court is placing its
imprimatur upon her unjust conduct in retaining the
ring or even, subject to the plaintiffs proof -- of her

any
unconscionable act of inducing the gift without
83
intention of consummating the marriage.'
XII.

LOWE'S PROGENY

The restriction placed upon the application of section 80-b
by the Lowe court remains in place to this day. 1 4 In Raji, the court
held that the rights ordinarily bestowed upon the donor of a gift
given in contemplation of marriage pursuant to section 80-b do not
apply where plaintiff was married at the time the gifts were
made.' 85 Likewise, the court noted that it was irrelevant that
time the gifts in
plaintiffs divorce action was pending at the
86
defendant.'
the
upon
question were bestowed
In Leemon, the court found that while a party may maintain
an action to recover property transferred in contemplation of a
marriage that did not occur, where the party is already married
when the property is given in contemplation of marriage, recovery
is barred. '

Lowe, 27 N.Y.2d 397, 405.
See Raji v. Nejad, 256 A.D.2d 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
185 Id.; see Leemon v. Wicke, 216 A.D.2d 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
186 id.
187 Id.; see Tomko at § 12; see also In re Uris' Estate, 188 Misc. 772 (N.Y. Sur.
183See
'84

Ct., New York County 1946). In Uris:
The alleged donee of jewelry, claimed to have been given as betrothal
gifts and later returned, could not recover damages for their alleged
conversion by the donor's executors and widow, held the court in
saying that the gifts were given at a time when the donor had a living
wife, and therefore at a time when the engagement between the donee
and the deceased was immoral and unlawful. It was said by the court to
follow, therefore, that the donee, having parted with the fruits of the
unlawful bargain, could not now resort to the courts to get back the
property. The court explained that the alleged donee's claim to the
property must fail, as a matter of law, for public policy reasons
connected with the preservation of the family unit.
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However, in Friedman v. Geller1 8 the New York City
Civil Court issued perhaps the most cogent and scathing criticism
of the Lowe decision to date. Though Friedman was not an
"impediment to marry" case, the court took umbrage with the
holding in Lowe, finding it to be "anachronistic." 18 9 Furthermore,
Judge DeMatteo found that:
The holding of the majority... appears inconsistent
with the era of the new public policy established by
the Legislature in section 80-b and the court in
Gaden. 0 Lowe fell victim to an inequitable fate
induced by the adherence of the majority to the
common-law rule of public policy which proscribed
an illegal marriage contract from being enforced.
Lowe was being chastised by the court for being a
married man at1 the time he extended a gift of a ring
19
to the donee.
Nineteen years later, in Witkowski, another Civil Court
Judge Weinstein 192
Judge criticized the Lowe decision.
acknowledged that pursuant to Lowe, ordinarily, he would be
powerless to render an award in favor of the plaintiff, since the
93
plaintiff was "under an impediment to marry the defendant. 1
However, due to his uneasiness with the Lowe Court's
arbitrary denial of relief to the "married" plaintiff, he refused to
follow the Lowe decision. In finding the defendant liable to the
plaintiff for the value of a diamond engagement ring, Judge
Weinstein expressed his belief that neither fault, 194 nor morality
may be considered in applying section 80-b of the Civil Rights
Law.
188

See infra note 6.

' Id. at 294.
190 See supra § X.

191 Friedman,82 Misc. 2d 291 at 294.
192 A former New York State Legislator.
'9'
Witkowski, 615 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641.
19 4 Id., (citing Gaden, 29 N.Y.2d at 88).
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In Shoenfeld v. Fontek, another example of a case involving
an impediment to marriage,195 the Supreme Court sought to
distinguish the present facts from those presented in Lowe. While
the Schoenfeld court acknowledged that "[w]here both parties are
aware at the time they agree to marry that one of them is still
bound by a prior undissolved marriage, the [Lowe] bar . .. is
operative... ,"196 it went on to state that even though:
The language employed by the majority opinion in
Lowe is broad enough to encompass the instant
case, this court is of the opinion that it is not
intended to bar an action for the return of property
by an innocent party, not aware of the other's
disability to contract a marriage at the time of the
"engagement". To so construe the holding would, in
this court's opinion, allow it to be used as a cloak
for fraud.
Most recently, in Marshall, 197 the Lowe exception was
visited yet again. 198 While acknowledging that "an engagement
ring 'is in the nature of a pledge for the contract of marriage' and,
195
Shoenfeld v. Fontek, 324 N.Y.S.2d 487 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
196

Id. at 489.

197Marshall v. Cassano, 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 40320U; 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS

585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau County 2001).
198 The facts established were that "[s]ometime in 1996, the Plaintiff separated
from his wife, non-party Ellen Grant Marshall, who thereafter commenced an
action for divorce against the Plaintiff in 1997. The Plaintiff subsequently met
Defendant and started living together on or about April 30, 2000, despite the
undisputed married status of the Plaintiff. During their time together, the
Plaintiff gave the Defendant "engagement" rings and a diamond bracelet upon
her promise to wed him when and if he became free. The Plaintiff and
Defendant were engaged to be married on August 27, 2001 in Hawaii and tickets
had allegedly been purchased for that trip .... Although the Marshalls entered
into a stipulation in open court settling the ground for the divorce and certain of
the ancillary issues on October 2, 2000, the judgment of divorce was held on
abeyance pending the final resolution of equitable distribution. No judgment of
divorce has ever been granted or entered on that matrimonial matter as of this
writing." Id.
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upon the breaking of the engagement, the recipient is required,
'upon demand, to return the ring on the theory that it constituted a
conditional gift,"' the court nevertheless denied plaintiff recovery
on the grounds that with respect to "an agreement to marry, where
one of the parties is already married, is void as against public
policy and no recovery may be had of any engagement ring or
other property given to the unmarried party in its
contemplation."1 9 9
The court further noted that "[s]uch an
agreement it is not saved or rendered valid by the fact that the
married individual contemplated divorce".
XIII.

THE RIGHT OF THIRD PARTIES WHO HAVE BESTOWED
GIFTS UPON THE ENGAGED COUPLE

Several states have recognized the rights of a third-party
donor who has given an engagement gift to seek its return upon the
breakup of the engaged couple. 2° 0Others
states have explicitly
2 1
third-parties.
such
to
recovery
denied
Presently, New York State recognizes the right of a thirdparty donor to recover a gift given
in contemplation of marriage,
202
where a marriage does not ensue.
However, there is one significant limitation on the right of
a third-party donor to recover an antenuptial gift in New York.
More specifically, if the third-party donor gives an antenuptial gift
directly to the donee, then such donor will be entitled to its return
where
marriage
doesconsideration20
not ensue. 2° 34 toWhere
the donor
gives
money the
or other
valuable
a third-party
on behalf

199 Id.

2°°See Tomko at § 26; see Wagener v. Papie, 242 Ill. App. 3d 354, 609 N.E.2d
951, 182 I11. Dec. 417 (Il1. App. 1 Dist. 1993); see McCormick v. Monette, 1 La.
App. 186 (1924); see Grossman v. Greenstein, 161 Md. 71, 155 A. 190 (1931).
2°PSee Tomko at § 26(b).
202 See Bruno, 549 N.Y.S.2d 925. More specifically, the Court noted that
"another person such as a parent of either party should be able to sue to recover
ifts given by that party." Id. at 926.
204 Id.
Which is intended to be a gift to the donees.
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of the intended donee,2 0 5 then such donor will not be entitled to the
return of such antenuptial gift where a marriage does not take
place. a 6
XIV.

OUR CASE STUDY REVISITED

Returning to the dilemma faced by Nick and Nora, supra,
under New York law today, Nora will be entitled to the return of
the gold watch, since it was given to Nick in contemplation of their
upcoming marriage. Likewise, Nick will be entitled to the return
of the engagement ring under that same theory.
Based upon the facts presented, Nora's parents will not be
entitled to recover the deposit monies they paid toward Nick and
Nora's wedding, since these monies were paid directly to thirdparty contractors, and not directly to Nick and Nora. 20 7 While this
distinction appears
irrelevant, 20 8 form, and not substance, is most
209
significant.
Turning to the rights of those third-parties who gave
engagement gifts directly to Nick and Nora, 21021it1 would appear that
they will be entitled to the return of such gifts.
205

Such as monies paid in advance of the marriage to caterers, photographers

and bandleaders.
206 This appears consistent with existing New York State law, since ordering the
recipient caterer/photographer/bandleader to return such consideration to the
third-party donor would, necessarily, nullify the recipient's contract rights. One
solution to this problem would be to order the intended donee(s) to return the
monetary equivalent of such consideration to the third-party donor. However,
the inherent problem with this approach is that the donee(s) would be guaranteed
an out of pocket loss, since the donee(s) never had possession of the
consideration given to the recipient caterer/photographer/bandleader.
207 Accordingly, the better approach would be for the third-party donor to give
the consideration at issue directly to the donee(s), with the understanding that it
be used to pay caterers/photographers/bandleaders/etc.
208 Since the donative intent existed in the minds of Nora's parents at the time
such monies were spent.
209 See Bruno, 549 N.Y.S.2d 925. To conclude otherwise would serve to nullify
such contractors' existing contract rights. See supra note 205.
210 Other than Nick and Nora's parents.
211Or the monetary equivalent of the same. See Bruno, 549 N.Y.S.2d,925.
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CONCLUSION

The law in the State of New York concerning the return of
gifts given in contemplation of marriage underwent numerous
changes during the twentieth century. Presently, Civil Rights Law
section 80-b provides that the donor of a gift given in
contemplation of marriage may recover such gift where marriage
does not ensue, regardless of who terminated the engagement, and
regardless of who was at fault for the termination of the
engagement.
The State of New York, in adopting a no-fault based
approach to the return of antenuptial gifts, has, for the most part,
been successful in thwarting many of the grave abuses that were
perpetrated under 2the
common law and, subsequently, under the
12
Civil Practice Act.
212

As noted by the court in Goldstein, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
In 1935 the Legislature enacted article 2-a of the Civil Practice Act. The
article sought to abolish causes of action for, among other things, breach
of contract to marry. Prior to that year, such "breach of promise" suits
were used by avaricious young women to mulct young me who were
both wealthy and rather susceptible to feminine wiles. The Legislature
found that such actions had been "subjected to grave abuses, causing
extreme annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary damage
to many persons, wholly innocent and free of any wrongdoing, who
were merely among the victims of circumstances, and such remedies
having been exercised by unscrupulous persons for their unjust
enrichment."
Under section 61-h of the Civil Practice Act .... apparently to
obey the legislative direction to construe the statute liberally,
the courts held that the statute not only barred the action for
breach of promise to marry against which it was directed, but
also actions to recover money, real property, or jewelry
delivered in anticipation of a marriage that did not occur.
(citation omitted).....
Instead of suing for breach of promise, a resourceful young woman
would simply persuade her swain to shower her with gifts in
anticipation of marriage which she herself would then reject. In trying
to remedy an old abuse, the courts seemingly permitted a new one. An
analogous arrangement existed among certain Indian tribes, as
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In short, the present statute, though imperfect, has virtually
eliminated the need for courts to entertain disputes involving
affairs of the heart.
However, despite the many successes of Civil Rights Law
section 80-b, the statute is not without its flaws. Ambiguities still
exist as to the very purpose and application of the statute. More
specifically, some courts have viewed section 80-b as merely
removing the prior statutory impediment to actions at common law
allowing for the recovery of antenuptial gifts. Most courts,
however, have opined that the present statute replaces not only the
prior statute, but also the common law with respect to the return of
gifts given in contemplation of marriage.
While the New York State Court of Appeals attempted to
clarify the scope of the present statute, as well as the intent of the
New York State Legislature, some believe that the Court of
Appeals overstepped its bounds by converting Civil Rights Law
section 80-b into a no-fault based statute, despite the fact that the
statute makes no reference to the fault of either the donor, or the
donee.
Moreover, the New York State Court of Appeals created
greater confusion by rendering inconsistent holdings in the first
two cases it heard following the enactment of section 80-b. In
described by Francis Parkman, in "The Jesuits in North America in the
Seventeenth Century." Enterprising Indian maids would enter into
connubial agreements with young braves which were to last a day, a
week, or more, the ultimate object being matrimony. 'The seal of the
compact was merely the acceptance of a gift of wampum made by the
suitor to the object of his desire or whim. These gifts were never
returned on the dissolution of the connection, and as an attractive and
enterprising damsel might, and often did, make twenty such marriages
before her final establishment, she thus collected wealth of wampum
with which to adorn herself for the village dances."
This state of law was sought to be avoided by judicial legerdemain
(citation omitted) and more directly criticized by learned commentators
(citation omitted).
Finally, in 1965, section 80-b was added to the Civil Rights Law to
provide that nothing in the statute shall be construed to bar a right of
action to recover property transferred solely in consideration of a
contemplated marriage that has not occurred.
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Lowe, the Court, rather moralistically, carved out an anomalous
exception to Civil Rights Law section 80-b and denied recovery to
a donor on the basis that he was aware that the donee was married
at the time he gave her an engagement ring. The Lowe Court has
been severely criticized by several of its own members, jurists
presiding over inferior tribunals within the state, and legal
commentators and experts alike.
Yet another issue that remains unsettled is the right of the
third-party donor to recover an antenuptial gift. Civil Rights Law
section 80-b is silent in this regard, and while the Bruno Court held
that a third-party donor may be entitled to recover an antenuptial
gift, it should be noted that Bruno, as a non-appellate level
decision, has limited authority.
Accordingly, it is imperative that the New York State
Legislature revisit the issue of the recovery of antenuptial gifts
where marriage does no ensue. It is urged that the Legislature put
to rest the Lowe exception, that it decide once and for all whether
the New York statute is a no-fault based statute or not, and that it
state whether or not third party donors have standing to recover.
One commentator has noted that:
It may be surprising to some that ex-fiancrs actually
sue one another over engagement rings. But
disappointment and hurt feelings often propel
people into vengeful acts. To a jilted would-be
bride, keeping the ring may be a small satisfaction.
To a would-be groom who has been jilted, losing
the ring, as3 well as the bride, may seem to add insult
21
to injury.
"Marriage is in every view the most important institution of
human society, it involves the most valued interests of every class;
awakens the thoughts and engages the care of nearly every
individual; and how it may be entered into, or how dissolved, or
what is the collateral effect of a dissolution, is a matter of almost
213

Grossman, supra note 13.
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' 214
constant legal inquiry and litigation.
The State of New York is no exception in this regard. In
fact, during the twentieth century lawsuits seeking the return of
engagement rings were commonplace, and the law governing such
cases was ever changing.
In 1965, New York, like many other states, attempted to
implement an objective, no-fault solution to this predicament.215
However, the present law is plagued by ambiguity, and the New
York courts
have been unwilling to implement the statute
2 16

uniformly.

If New York State is to achieve its goal of having a truly
objective, no-fault based solution to the present question, then it is
incumbent upon the New York State Legislature to rectify the
confusion
it caused when it enacted Civil Rights law section 807
b21

214 See Brian L. Kruckenberg, "I Don't": Determining Ownership of the

Engagement Ring When the Engagement Terminates, 37 WASHBuRN L.J. at 425
(1998); citing Michael Grossberg, Governing the Heart: Law and the Family in
Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica 31 (1985); citing Joel P. Bishop, Commentaries on
the Law of Marriageand Divorce (1852).
215 Via the enactment of Civil Rights Law § 80-b.
216 Perhaps the most stunning example of this is reflected in the holding in Lowe,
27 N.Y.2d 397.
217 The author maintains that the New York State Legislature should amend the
present § 80-b. Such amendment must specify that it supplants the common
law, and that it creates a separate, statutory right, allowing a donor to seek the
return of an antenuptial gift where marriage does not ensue.
Moreover, the amendment must specify that the statute is to be applied
objectively, and that fault, either of the donor, or of the donee (in either
effectuating, or causing a break up), will not be considered.
Next, the statute must address the Lowe decision. In this regard, the Legislature
must state that antenuptial gifts are conditional gifts, and as such, shall be
returned to the donor where such condition (i.e., the marriage) has not occurred,
regardless of whether an impediment to such marriage existed.
Finally, the statute should acknowledge the rights of third-party donors to
recover antenuptial gifts where the marriage of the donees does not ensue.

